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# WEEKLY VIETNAM INDICATORS


Week Ending 28 November 1970

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For the President Only



# SOUTH VIETNAM WEEKLY INDICATORS



FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

## Enemy Activity

Enemy-initiated activity remained at a low level throughout South Vietnam except in the Delta, where there was an increase in attacks by fire and ground probes against isolated outposts.

Government irregulars have launched a large-scale raid in north Laos against a major Communist logistical center. If successful, this raid should help to disrupt enemy supply efforts into the Plaine des Jarres and ease the pressure the Communists are maintaining on government outposts to the west of the PDJ. In south Laos, an important government paramilitary site (PS-38) on the eastern Bolovens has again been overrun. In the northern portion of the Bolovens, however, a government drive to secure the area north of Paksong has met little resistance. This latter drive is being backed by the FAR Regional Commander (General Phasouk) and FAR units are actively cooperating with SGU's in this operation.

In Cambodia, during the past week Communist forces continued to apply considerable pressure on important government positions and lines of communications. Government troops sustained heavy casualties in their efforts to regain lost ground in several areas around the country. Contrary to some press reports and speculation, however, Phnom Penh itself does not appear to be in any heightened immediate danger.

## Enemy Infiltration

Infiltration activity continued at a brisk rate as five battalion-size and six small, specially designated groups were added to the infiltration estimate during the week. These groups have an estimated combined strength of 2,800. Thus, the total pipeline input for November -- including Laos and South Vietnam/Cambodia-bound groups -- has reached some 17,800, the highest figure since February 1969 (25,000). Additionally, evidence continues to mount that elements, as yet unidentified, of the 2nd NVA Division are returning to South Vietnam from southern Laos where they had deployed last summer to protect the Ho Chi Minh trail. These elements of the 2nd NVA Division are not included as part of the total number of infiltrators since 1 October 1970, a number which now stands at an estimated 25, 300 - 27,800.

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## South Vietnam Developments

Despite renewed leftist efforts to stimulate student protest activities, the general situation in Saigon remains quiet. Most of the current political maneuvering seems aimed at the 1971 presidential elections. General Duong Van "Big" Minh confirmed on 27 November that he is a candidate, but stated he had not yet chosen a running mate. Minh said that he is "utterly opposed" to a coalition government, and if elected, will never accept one with the Communists. Minh retains considerable popularity as a result of his role in the overthrow of the Diem regime, and could be a strong contender, especially if he actually receives the support the An Quang Buddhists now seem inclined to give him.

President Thieu has informed Ambassador Bunker that he is planning to make changes in his cabinet in December. These changes would include the departments or ministeries of information, education, health, ethnic minorities, and national police. Thieu also says he is planning to establish a new ministry of industrial development and planning. Even though any cabinet changes Thieu makes would probably not be primarily designed to broaden the base of his government, Thieu may use the occasion of a shuffle to mend his somewhat battered relations with South Vietnam's urban political parties. Thieu has irritated many political figures through neglect and by the heavy handed way in which his supporters attempted to manipulate the recent election for National Assembly officers.

#### Communist Developments

The unilateral announcement by the Viet Cong of brief holiday truces at Christmas, New Years and Tet is an annual ritual and does not by itself signify Communist interest in moving into an extended cease-fire situation in line with President Nixon's proposal. Indeed, VC radio broadcasts last week reiterated standard Communist objections to the President's proposal when they criticized U.S. motivations in hinting at an extended Allied stand down over the holiday period.

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The DRV Foreign Ministry statement issued on 27 November, several days after Hanoi had withdrawn from circulation an earlier Foreign Ministry statement glossing over the POW rescue attempt, contains one noteworthy point in addition to its routine denunciation of the air strikes as a menace to the Paris talks. In this statement Hanoi claimed that there is no U.S.-DRV understanding, and asserted that the Son Tay raid shows how "adventurous and hysterical" the U.S. administration is. In a most unusual reference to DRV activity in Laos, the Hanoi statement takes note of the U.S. position that air strikes against the North would be carried out not only to protect reconnaissance flights, but also to protect flights related to interdiction missions "against North Vietnamese military supplies to South Vietnam via Laos." Meanwhile, in apparent reaction to the Son Tay raid, the DRV press has called on the local troops to improve their ability to react to all American operations against the North. As one article said, "Our armed forces and people have taken measures... to protect American pilots captured and detained here. " It also warned that the U.S., by their "reckless war acts," will be held entirely responsible "for the lives of these captured Americans. "

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